But Findlay's remark, like so much that has been written on the subject of time in the present century, was provoked in the first place by McTaggart's ...

Divided into two parts, the first concentrates on the logical properties of propositions, their relation to facts and sentences, and the parallel objects of commands and questions. The second part examines theories of intentionality and discusses the relationship between different theories of naming and different accounts of belief.

The John Locke Lectures for 1955-6 delivered at the University of Oxford.

This book was designed primarily as a textbook; though the author hopes that it will prove to be of interests to others beside logic students. Part I of this book covers the fundamentals of the subject the propositional calculus and the theory of quantification. Part II deals with the traditional formal logic and with the developments which have taken that as their starting-point. Part III deals with modal, three-valued, and extensional systems.

This is a revised and expanded edition of a seminal work in the logic and philosophy of time, originally published in 1968. Arthur N. Prior was the founding father of temporal logic, and his book offers an excellent introduction to the fundamental questions in the field. Several important papers have been added to the original selection, as well as a comprehensive bibliography of Prior's work and an illuminating interview with his widow, Mary Prior. In addition, the Polish logic which made (...) Prior's writings difficult for many readers has been replaced by standard logical notation. This new edition will secure the classic status of the book. (shrink)

This is the text of The Lindley Lecture for 1962, given by Arthur N. Prior (1914-1969).

This book discusses and aims to clarify the issue of describing conduct and character as ‘good’ or ‘bad’, or as ‘right’ or ‘wrong’. The book states that one of the main factors that have made this issue obscure is the illusion of some anti-naturalists that purely logical considerations can settle it. It clearly defines the limitations of the discussions: it is not concerned with the ‘other things’ people use to define conduct and character. The book attempts to consider the issue (...) from the purely logician point of view and suggests to the naturalists and anti-naturalists how their positions may be freed from logical faults. The book also introduces the ‘logic of ethics’, which is not a special kind or branch of logic, but rather an application of it. (shrink)

“Arthur Prior’s Formal logic has been familiar to students for twenty years, but the historical section that was originally meant to accompany it was never published. In this book P. T. Geach and A. J. P. Kenny have selected from those parts of the material that were not superseded by Prior’s later publications a self-contained study of the philosophical prehistory of contemporary logic. Like Prior’s early work Logic and the Basis of Ethics the material here presented is both historical and (...) critical: Prior was not concerned to decide for us the controverted questions of logical doctrine which he discusses. He may be compared to an experienced judge summing up in a complicated civil action: the case for each side is clearly and fairly presented, and although on some issues the summing-up amounts to a pretty clear direction of the jury, the jurymen themselves are left to decide the issues. The value of such an historical survey is to be measured by the ill effects of ignoring our predecessors’ labours. The course of the philosophy of logic in the decades since Prior wrote these pages has continued to illustrate the saying that those who will not learn the history of philosophy are compelled to relive it.” - Publisher. (shrink)

Particular attention has been paid in the present century to the question as to whether a man's duty is to do what is actually right, i.e. what his situation actually demands of him, or what he thinks is right. Mr. Carritt has pointed out that the former possibility bifurcates—a man's duty may be to do what is actually demanded by his actual situation, or what is actually demanded by what he believes to be his situation. I do not propose in (...) the present paper to carry this discussion any further, but rather to consider how it has been carried on in the past, as there seems to be a little confusion on this point. (shrink)

Iš anglų kalbos vertė ir pratarmę parašė Živilė Pabijutaitė (Vilniaus universitetas) ir Pranciškus Gricius (Vilniaus universitetas).